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Eta-Pi Chapter

Western Kentucky University

PREFACE

While often overshadowed by faculty research, the efforts of students should not be overlooked, and this journal hopefully will encourage scholarly research by students and provide a means by which their efforts will be recognized. Phi Alpha Theta is greatly indebted to the History Department of Western Kentucky University headed by Dr. Richard Troutman. We are grateful to our Consulting Editors, Dr. Charles Bussey, Dr. Carol Crowe Carraco, and Dr. David Lee, for their assistance in this project. For their tireless and exacting effort Phi Alpha Theta thanks our typists, Lecia Mayhugh and Ruth Cornelius. Our most profound debt of gratitude goes to the contributing writers--those who were published and those who were not--that constitute a group which forms the heart of any publication.

The logo of Phi Alpha Theta appears on the cover of the journal. The six-pointed star, which is composed of two triangles, is worked in black enamel and laid on a circular frame, the whole encircled by a Serpent. Three forces may be thought of as controlling man and the universe: the Father, the Word, and the Spirit - a trinity which is symbolized by one of the triangles. Ancient philosophers believed that man and the world were made of three elements - Spirit, Blood, and Water. These are represented by the second triangle of the Star. The triangle with apex below the base symbolizes the spiritual and divine. The Greek letter Pi signifies Pater (Father), and letter Psi signifies Psyche (Spirit), and the letter Lambda signifies Logos (Word). The triangle with apex above the base symbolizes the earthly and human. The letter Alpha signifies Haima (Blood), the letter Upsilon signifies Hydor (Water), and the letter Psi signifies Psyche (Spirit).

The union of these two triangles forming the six-pointed star (the Ancient Assyrian sign of divinity) symbolizes the intimate relation between the divine and the human. By some ancient peoples the Serpent was regarded as a symbol of eternity, good fortune, and plenty. In our symbolism, it signifies happiness, fruitfulness and eternity. Within the two triangles are the three letters Phi, Alpha, Theta - Philia, Anthropos, Theos - signifying Love, Man, God.

Eta Pi Chapter
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Western Kentucky University

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JAMES EDWARD OGLETHORPE: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FOR THE FORCES OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND GEORGIA, 1738-43

James Edward Oglethorpe, most often remembered as the humanitarian founder of the colony of Georgia, played an equally important role as defender of the British claim on the southern frontier of America. More than anyone else, it was Oglethorpe who obtained men and money for the establishment of the British line of defense against the Spanish in Florida. Yet his military exploits are overshadowed by the settlement and reform efforts that took place within the colony. The fact remains, however, it was James Oglethorpe whom King George II entrusted with the military responsibility for South Carolina and Georgia during the War of Jenkins' Ear.

He was born on December 22, 1696, the ninth child of Theophilus and Eleanor Oglethorpe. His father was a member of the English gentry who, in 1709, purchased a commission for James as Ensign in Her Majesty's Footguards, an elite regiment assigned to the palace.[1] Four years later young Oglethorpe was appointed Captain of the Footguards with the rank of Lieutenant, but the acquisition of officer's rank marked the end of his early military career for his parents insisted upon the completion of his education. In 1713 Oglethorpe entered Eton College and later went to Oxford to complete his studies at Corpus Christi College, but after only two years he left school to be with his family in France. Although enrolled in an Academy, Oglethorpe's desire for the military returned and in 1717 he joined the army of Prince Eugene of Savoy, through purchase of another commission.[2] Oglethorpe never distinguished himself in battle and soon realized that his capabilities and enthusiasm for a military life were both less than anticipated. Instead, upon returning to his homeland, he secured a seat in Parliament and entered English politics.

In 1729, as Chairman of a House of Commons committee, Oglethorpe exposed the deplorable conditions of gaols in which debtors were placed. His investigative actions revealed the corrupt prison system in England, an issue which Oglethorpe exploited for personal gain in Parliament, and one which in turn, preceded his most notable achievement.[3] In 1732 he devised a plan by which England might alleviate its overcrowded gaols and reduce unemployment by providing a new area of settlement on the southern frontier of America.[4] Such a colony would be important in several respects: it would relocate the less fortunate, aid the mercantile policy of trade with America, and expand British influence in the south. The greatest contribution, however, would be the establishment of a buffer zone between the English settlements in South Carolina and the Spanish in Florida. With these benefits in mind, George II chartered the colony of Georgia on April 23, 1732.

In November of the same year, Oglethorpe and the first group of settlers crossed the Atlantic and landed at Charlestown in January, 1733. Within weeks, the colonists selected a high bluff on the Savannah River on which to establish the first settlements in Georgia. However, the area was already inhabited by the Yamacraw Indians who, although peaceful, were nevertheless cautious of the white intruders. Oglethorpe negotiated immediately a treaty with Tomochichi, chieftain of the Yamacraws, which was beneficial to both parties. Oglethorpe

promised fair trading practices from English merchants and a fair price for land in return for an alliance with the Indians.[5]

During the years 1734-35, as new settlers began to arrive with some degree of regularity, Oglethorpe directed the building of a series of fortifications along the Georgia coastline to extend and strengthen the British claim. The construction of these forts intensified uneasy feelings between the two nations, and Oglethorpe received an additional 700 men from the English standing army as well as being commissioned Brigadier-General and Commander-in-Chief of all forces in the southernmost colonies.[6]

In an attempt to pacify relations in America, Oglethorpe and the Spanish Governor of Florida, Moral Sanchez, reached a tentative agreement called the Treaty of Frederica. The terms of the document stated that each nation would refrain from harassing tactics, control their respective Indian allies, and allow the mother countries to decide any territorial disputes. Oglethorpe also agreed to abandon some of his southernmost forts, but these terms enraged the Spanish King, Philip V, who recalled Sanchez and repudiated the treaty.[7]

Oglethorpe sensed that fighting would occur eventually between the two colonial powers and that Georgia, a buffer zone, would become a major theater of operations in the south. He was attending a tribal council of Indian allies when news of war reached him in 1740. The Indians demonstrated their allegiance to Oglethorpe, as it was they who supplied the first information of Spanish troop movements in Florida. A small party of Creeks, while on a hunting expedition into northern Florida, discovered a Spanish plan to sail against Oglethorpe's forts. Furthermore, Oglethorpe learned that the Spanish had killed two unarmed Scottish Highlanders during a raid on Amelia Island.[8] War and bloodshed was now a reality in America, and Oglethorpe determined to lead his British forces to victory.

Early in 1740 Oglethorpe mobilized his men for an offensive into Florida. His objective was St. Augustine, the key port for commerce that passed between Spain and her rich Caribbean colonies. This trade route was of utmost importance because if it were severed, the Spanish war effort would be affected in Georgia as well as in Europe.[9] In late February a British fleet, under the command of Commodore Vincent Pearse, started patrolling the Florida coast to prevent supplies from reaching St. Augustine. Parliament, meanwhile, appropriated the money Oglethorpe requested for the campaign, and South Carolina voted to send 400 men to Georgia for the offensive.

Oglethorpe commanded a military force consisting of his Indian allies, South Carolina militia, troops from England, and local Georgians. Also at his disposal was the fleet under Pearse. Oglethorpe planned to assemble his forces at the St. Johns River in northern Florida as soon as possible, then take St. Augustine before the advent of summer. But the South Carolina troops, under the command of Alexander Vanderdrussen, were deliberate in their movements which disrupted the original plan of a pre-summer campaign. Oglethorpe grew impatient and declared, "the longer we delay attacking them, the stronger they will be."[10] Vanderdrussen made contact finally with the expedition in early May, and Oglethorpe set out for St. Augustine with more than 1500 men under his command.

On May 12, 1740, the combatants approached a small camp, Fort Diego. Oglethorpe demanded and received its immediate surrender.[11] Although no one knew it at the time, this encounter was the only real victory of the expedition for the British force.[12] A week later Oglethorpe and Pearse decided, based upon their limited information of the defenses at St. Augustine, that a two-front attack was the best course of action, with Oglethorpe driving the civilians out of the town and into the fort, which Pearse and his fleet would then bombard into submission.

In late May the invading force moved further south to Fort Mosa, an abandoned settlement only two miles north of St. Augustine. When Oglethorpe reconnoitered the area, however, he realized that the impregnable walls of St. Augustine made a frontal attack impossible. Moreover, the Spanish had placed six half-galleys in the shallow waters surrounding the fort, and these small vessels, armed with nine pound cannon, would prevent Pearse from moving into position for his bombardment of the fort. In order for the British fleet cannon to be effective, Pearse would have to enter the harbor and subject his ships to a crossfire from the fort and the half-galleys, something which he was not willing to do. Therefore, without cannon support from the fleet, the original plan of Oglethorpe was discarded and a new scheme devised. Pearse recommended that a siege be implemented with his ships producing the necessary blockade, but he stipulated that if the Spanish did not submit by July 5, he would disembark and return to England. His tour of naval duty would have then expired, and the hurricane season would be approaching.[13] With no other immediate alternatives, Oglethorpe consented reluctantly.

As days turned into weeks, the Spanish showed no signs of surrendering. Obviously, the food supply within the fort was greater than anticipated and Oglethorpe, impatient for action, decided to eliminate the half-galleys in the harbor. A new plan developed as Pearse secured Anastasia Island, east of the fort, where cannon were placed to fire upon the small vessels. Another battery was located on Point Quartell, northeast of St. Augustine, under the direction of Vanderdrussen, to fire upon the fort. During the afternoon of June 14, Oglethorpe received word that all troops were in position for the assault upon the half-galleys and fort, but he decided to wait and attack at dawn. This decision was the turning point of the St. Augustine campaign.

Upon his arrival at Fort Mosa several weeks earlier, Oglethorpe dispatched a small number of men to patrol the area daily and to be constantly on the move. If the Spanish were aware of the patrol's location, they would be free to roam elsewhere and resupply their stock of food. But as the days of marching became monotonous and the scorching heat bore down upon them, the disillusioned soldiers camped outside Fort Mosa.[14] The food supply within St. Augustine was nearing exhaustion when the Spanish Governor of Florida, Manuel de Montiano, conceived a pre-dawn attack upon the British. He assembled 300 men and while the invaders slept, the Spaniards attacked. Earlier that morning, the 15th, Oglethorpe's Rangers reported that they had heard Spanish Indians doing a war dance, but the information was discarded and no alarm raised by the English.[15] Oglethorpe's men were caught asleep, unarmed, and unprepared for a fight. The attack became a rout with over 65 Englishmen killed and 34 imprisoned out of a total of 135 men. Two days before the attack, the Spanish were almost ready to acknowledge defeat; now they refused to yield to Oglethorpe's demands for surrender.[16] This debacle demoralized the British troops, yet Oglethorpe was more determined

than ever to carry out his mission. On June 21 he commenced a four day bombardment of the fort, which did not induce the Spanish to submission nor silence their guns.

Oglethorpe was understandably puzzled as to what his next move should be. He had tried several tactics but none had succeeded. Vanderdrussen opted for a night raid, but Pearse disapproved because he was wary of the shallow water around the fort. Next, Vanderdrussen proposed a battery be set up to control access to the mouth of the St. Sebastion River. If this could be accomplished, St. Augustine would be encompassed and all supplies would be halted. However, the new plan required at least seven more ships, and on June 26, Pearse stated bluntly that he would not assist in the new endeavor. Now within a week of his departure, he would not risk any ships or men, leaving Oglethorpe to combat the Spanish as best he could.

As the hot, sultry days ushered in the month of July, a series of events guaranteed Oglethorpe's failure in Florida. On July 3, some small vessels were able to slip past the English fleet and resupply St. Augustine with food. With the fort partially restocked, all prospect of starving the enemy in the near future was lost. The fleet was leaving in only two days, Oglethorpe's own men were disgruntled, and most of the Carolina troops were sick or fatigued as a result of the humid summer days. Finally, Oglethorpe himself fell ill with fever, and on July 4, 1740, he ordered a retreat to Georgia.

The expedition was a failure, but who was to blame? Obviously, Oglethorpe's original plan of a combined land and sea attack required almost perfect coordination, sometimes difficult under the best of circumstances and not feasible under the existing conditions. Moreover, Oglethorpe planned originally for an early spring assault on the fortress, but had to wait until May, when additional help arrived in the person of Vanderdrussen and his men. Furthermore, some of Oglethorpe's own men disobeyed his orders at Fort Mosa and paid the price with their lives. If they had been on patrol as instructed, a successful Spanish attack was improbable and supplies as well as morale within the fort would have continued in decline.

The fleet, under Pearse, was another factor in the failure of the campaign. Pearse and his ships proved to be no more than spectators throughout the offensive. By allowing the half-galleys to control the harbor, without attempting to eliminate them, Pearse crippled Oglethorpe's principle plan of attack. The fleet cannon did fire upon the fort, but inflicted no serious damage, and when several ships pulled back from their original positions, the siege collapsed. Pearse seemed not to care; his main concern was the security of his ships, not the capture of St. Augustine. His lack of initiative was an open invitation to the Spanish, who responded by slipping a number of small vessels through the loosely constructed blockade.

Oglethorpe also must bear partial responsibility for the defeat. He commanded a formidable army, yet never utilized the full potential of the force. After his first abortive attempt, Oglethorpe was seemingly mystified and relied on subordinates, whose plans likewise met with failure. He must also accept blame for the fiasco outside Fort Mosa. Although not present at the attack, the men were under his command and, therefore, they were his responsibility. Lastly, Oglethorpe was ill with fever, another element which must be considered when recounting his inability to capture St. Augustine.

But possibly the greatest reason for the failure of the expedition was the determined Spanish resistance. While Oglethorpe led his troops through northern Florida, Montiano withdrew his men to their best equipped location, St. Augustine. By placing the half-galleys in the harbor, the Spanish dealt a mortal blow to the original plan of Oglethorpe, as the fleet was forced to anchor offshore. When Montiano devised a pre-dawn attack upon an area which Oglethorpe occupied, it was successful not only in defeating the English and acquiring badly needed food, but it also provided the extra incentive necessary to hold out during the siege.

It was a tired, disappointed man, sick with fever who drew his army back before the walls of St. Augustine, but if Oglethorpe had failed in his primary objective, he had at least succeeded in delaying a Spanish attack on Georgia.[17] During the spring of 1741 Oglethorpe strengthened his fortifications, repaired old batteries, and made several appeals for additional men, but England could not spare any troops because of the continental war with Spain. In a letter written to Sir Robert Walpole, England's leading minister, Oglethorpe reported that he had fortified as well as he could all the outposts, all that remained was to wait.[18] But the Spanish did not appear that year and 1741 passed without any serious encounters.

Oglethorpe, by his failure in Florida and the absence of an expected Spanish counterattack,drew into question his competence as the military leader of Georgia, but at a time when he well could have been discouraged, the summer of 1742 produced the most glorious incident in Oglethorpe's career as a soldier.[19] During May, he received reports of greatly increased travel between Cuba and St. Augustine; Montiano was being resupplied and an attack on Georgia appeared forthcoming. The Creeks confirmed this news as they skirmished with a Spanish scouting party within Georgia's boundaries. Although the tension eased for a time as excessive rains fell for a two week period, when they subsided on June 21, 1742, the Spanish exchanged cannon fire with Fort Prince William on the southern tip of Georgia. The long dreaded invasion had begun.[20]

Montiano, again the leader of the Spanish, commanded a fleet of 51 ships and almost 2,000 soldiers.[21] He planned to invade St. Simons Island, work his way up the coastline to Fort Frederica, and eventually into South Carolina. He was instructed by Philip V to conduct his campaigns with a minimum loss of Spanish lives. On June 27, Oglethorpe arrived at Fort St. Simons. Even with additional troops from Fort Frederica, his total force in Georgia numbered no more than 1,000 men. Oglethorpe had no navy, except for a few small vessels, but he was determined to inflict as much damage on the enemy at St. Simons as possible. If his defenses could withstand the Spanish attack for an extended period of time, Oglethorpe hoped that additional men could be secured from South Carolina.

As morning dawned, June 28, the main elements of the Spanish fleet appeared off St. Simons Island. But once again, the weather intervened as the prevailing wind direction prevented the ships from entering the channel. Oglethorpe used this delay to strengthen his defenses, and by the time the Spanish were ready to attack, he had more than one-half of his total force on St. Simons.[22] On July 5, the wind and tide were both right to enter the channel and the Spanish exchanged fire with Oglethorpe's cannon, but the ships were able to slip past and outflank the garrison. As darkness fell, Oglethorpe withdrew to Fort Frederica with all the artillery and supplies that could be transported; the remainder was destroyed.[23] Two days later, the most important contact between the opposing armies occured at "Bloody Marsh." Montiano sent out a small detachment to scout

the island, but as the Spanish advanced, they encountered Oglethorpe's Rangers on patrol. Each side fired several shots and the Rangers scurried back to Fort Frederica to report the clash. Oglethorpe assumed immediately this force to be Montiano's frontal attack and he ordered his Indian allies and British regulars forward to skirmish against the enemy. The Spanish advanced to within one mile of Fort Frederica before they were engaged by Oglethorpe and his men. In close fighting, the British proved to be most effective and overwhelmed the invaders. This small battle left 36 Spaniards killed, wounded or captured whereas Oglethorpe lost only one man.

When the remnants of the Spanish scouting party returned to camp and reported the clash, Montiano became enraged and ordered an additional 200 men to march back and clear the way for his invading force. Meanwhile, Oglethorpe placed his men at strategic positions throughout a wooded, marshy area on the trail to Frederica, and as the Spanish troops approached, the hidden Englishmen fired a volley. Dense undergrowth limited visibility, yet each side fired at will. The English line broke, however, when they realized the Spanish were far superior in numbers. When Oglethorpe heard the sound of renewed fighting he hastened to the scene of battle, only to find his troops retreating in disarray.[24] Oglethorpe encouraged his men to hold their positions and the English counterattacked with Oglethorpe leading the charge. Although he had less than one-half the number of the Spanish army, Oglethorpe routed the advance force of Montiano and the English pursued until they were within a mile of the main body of the Spanish camp. But after viewing the Spanish entrenchments, Oglethorpe decided to march back to Frederica, rest his men and wait for a better opportunity to strike the Spanish.[25]

On July 9, a Spanish deserter informed Oglethorpe of the declining morale among the enemy, and three days later, Oglethorpe and his men advanced toward Montiano in a daring night raid. Their surprise attack was spoiled however, when a soldier fired his musket and fled to the enemy's lines. It is not known whether the musket was fired on purpose or by accident, but Montiano was alerted to the presence of the English, and Oglethorpe returned to Frederica.[26]

During the next week Oglethorpe penned a letter to his musket-firing deserter, instructing him to understate the strength of the English army and add other details which would induce Montiano to attack. In actuality, the understatement of strength was very close to the truth, but Montiano did not know this. Oglethorpe placed the letter within a Spanish prisoner's belongings and set him free, knowing he would return to his camp.[27] Immediately upon arriving, the freed Spaniard underwent questioning and a search revealed the letter which was given to Montiano, who became very suspicious of it. That same afternoon, five British commercial vessels were spotted to the north of St. Simons. These ships posed no threat to the Spanish, but Montiano questioned whether or not they were a forerunner of the naval support which Oglethorpe lacked, and if so, the entire Spanish fleet could be trapped within the harbor. Faced with these circumstances, Montiano ordered an immediate retreat from St. Simons Island and by July 15, the Spanish fleet was offshore at Fort Prince William, heading for St. Augustine. This departure marked Spain's last full scale attempt to dislodge the British from the southern frontier of America.[28]

The expulsion of the Spanish and the successful defense of Georgia by Oglethorpe was the result of many diverse elements. Often overlooked by contemporaries, the weather played a role in determining the victory. When heavy rains fell in June, the Spanish were prevented from mobilizing according to schedule, and when

they arrived at St. Simons, the wind and tide combined to prohibit the ships from entering the harbor. This delay allowed Oglethorpe additional time to prepare his defenses.

Furthermore, Montiano's inability to command troops in offensive action hastened the English victory. The Spanish commander had twice as many men as Oglethorpe and easily could have outnumbered his opponent, had he been willing to send out a sufficient number of troops against Fort Frederica. Montiano's conservative nature led to his own defeat. Moreover, Philip V's order for a minimal loss of life preserved the victory. Although Montiano possessed incomplete information concerning Oglethorpe's defenses, he was confident of victory. But when British vessels appeared off the coast, Montiano withdrew his men fearing a naval conflict in which his fleet could be inferior, and at the very least, trapped within the harbor.

Oglethorpe can accept all the honors bestowed for the successful defense of Georgia. He was much better suited for defensive manoeuvring of troops, and demonstrated a courageous vigor in the fighting, rallying, and leading of his men to victory. Given the vast difference in size of forces, Oglethorpe displayed an unusual ability to use effectively his limited resources, and even psychological warfare on his opponent. Only two years after his rebuff in Florida, Oglethorpe had developed the qualities of a successful defensive soldier.

Several weeks after the Spanish departure, a relief fleet from South Carolina anchored at Fort Frederica. With six British Men of War, six smaller armed vessels and several scouting boats, Oglethorpe ordered a naval counterattack upon St. Augustine. The small navy appeared off the Spanish fortress in late August, 1742. The half-galleys still blockaded the harbor, but since Oglethorpe possessed smaller ships, which could enter the shallow waters, he felt confident of eliminating the pesky vessels. But a high tide and strong surf prevented his ships from entering the harbor for several days, and with hurricane season approaching rapidly, Oglethorpe decided to return to the safety of his colony.[29]

In the spring of 1743 he tried once more to conquer St. Augustine. By dispatching his men in small groups, marching constantly and ravaging the area around the fort, Oglethorpe hoped to lure the Spanish out to skirmish against his forces. But they were not duped by such tactics and refused to leave their garrison. Several weeks later Oglethorpe ordered his forces back to Georgia, resigned to his failure to capture the elusive Spanish base. He would not try again to take St. Augustine.

Oglethorpe sailed for England in late 1743 to explore the current situation on the continent. He was never to return to Georgia. In March, 1744, Oglethorpe received his own regiment of British troops and a commission as Major-General, but the rank was short-lived. The following year formal court martial charges were brought against him for neglect of duty, when he failed to guard effectively an escape route which Scottish rebels used to elude capture. Oglethorpe resigned his commission, and although acquitted of the charge, his life as a soldier ended.[30]

James Oglethorpe exhibited personal courage, energy, and determination during his campaigns in the south. He possessed an inner fervor as field commander, and despite his failures at St. Augustine, he successfully defended his own territory, his own home, his own dream. Although Oglethorpe tried to capture St. Augustine on several occasions, it was his refusal to yield to the Spanish invasion of Georgia

which was of far greater military importance. Oglethorpe's life as a soldier took him from standard European tactics in 1718 to guerilla tactics against the Spanish in 1742. He experienced both success and failure on the battlefield, but it was his victorious defensive campaign of Georgia which preserved his reputation as a soldier. During his lifetime, James Edward Oglethorpe founded Georgia, administered to its every need, and successfully defended the British claim on the southern frontier of America.

NOTES

[1]Amos Aschbach Ettinger, James Edward Oglethorpe: Imperial Idealist (Oxford, 1936), 58.

[2]Charles C. Jones, A History of Georgia (2 vols., Boston, 1883), II, 83.

[3]Ettinger, James Edward Oglethorpe, 92.

[4]Ibid., 110.

[5]Phinizy Spalding, Oglethorpe in America (Chicago, 1972), 79.

[6]Douglas Edward Leach, Arms For Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763 (New York, 1973), 211.

[7]Ibid., 189.

[8]Colonial Records of the State of Georgia (28 vols., to date, New York, 1970), XXII pt. 2, 312.

[9]Leach, Arms for Empire, 211

[10]Thomas Spalding. "A Sketch of the Life of James Oglethorpe," Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, I (1840), 107.

[11]William Stephens, A Journal of Proceedings in Georgia (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966), 389.

[12]Spalding, Oglethorpe in America, 110.

[13]Larry Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1974), 109.

[14]Ibid., 116.

[15]Report of the House of Assembly of South Carolina, Expedition Against St. Augustine, (Charlestown, 1743), 46.

[16]Ivers, British Drums, 125

[17]Trevor Richard Reese, Colonial Georgia: A Study in British Imperial Policy in the Eighteenth Century (Athens, Ga., 1963), 80.

[18]General Oglethorpe's Georgia: Colonial Letters, 1738-43 (2 vols., Savannah, Ga., 1975), II, 602, Hereafter referred to as Colonial Letters.

[19]Peggy Robbins, "The Most Remarkable James Oglethorpe," American History Illustrated, V (Aug., 1970), 45.

[20]Ivers, British Drums, 150.

[21]Colonial Letters, II, 616.

[22]E. Merton Coulter, ed., Journal of William Stephens, 1741-43 (Athens, Ga., 1958), I, 105; Colonial Letters, II, 619.

[23]Colonial Letters, II, 620.

[24]Ibid., 621.

[25]Spalding, Oglethorpe in America, 139.

[26]Ivers, British Drums, 169.

[27]Colonial Letters, II, 633.

[28]Robbins, "The Remarkable Oglethorpe," 46.

[29]Ivers, British Drums, 172.

[30]Ettinger, James Edward Oglethorpe, 337.

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CHARLES DICKENS:

SOCIAL CONSCIENCE OF VICTORIAN ENGLAND

The richest and most complex portrait of Victorian England was not drawn with pastels and paints, but with pen and ink; its artist was not Hogarth or Millais or Rosetti, but a novelist whose name has become synonymous with nineteenth century England: Charles Dickens. Recognized by literary critics and historians alike for his panoramic view of English life, Dickens created in his twenty major novels an imaginary world that chronicles what has become "typically Victorian." He was, however, a pioneer of sorts, for he chose to write about scenes from English life that had always been considered inappropriate for literature, "low" material as it was called. And this decision marks a departure not only for literature, but for Dickens, who had, with sensitive perception, seen changes occurring in English life, changes precipitated by increased industrialization which brought new problems to England and new challenges to the English government. As he attacked these problems in his later novels, his numerous essays, and speeches, Dickens emerged as an effective and indignant voice of protest against what he saw as raging social injustice and against a government which he began to believe was unable to cope with the problems. This pessimism pervades his later novels.

The social novel surfaced in the 1830's as a partial outgrowth of the political agitation of the time. Romanticism, a dying form with its emotionalism and idealism, found a partial rebirth in political and social aspirations and a vehicle in the novel.[1] While all of Dickens' novels reflect this growing awareness of the power of literature in attacking social wrongs, it is his work of the 1840's and 1850's that best illustrates Dickens' reform tendencies. By this time, Dickens had come to view pessimistically "his society as a muddle of greed, selfishness, snobbery, and bungling inefficiency,"[2] and to fear the threat to the individual, the degradation of human spontaneity, that went hand in hand with the triumph of machinery and industrialization.[3] Man, he believed, was becoming "isolated in a world of increasing ugliness and diminishing meaning."[4] In novel after novel from this period, Dickens indicted the various forces of society that imprison the individual; in Bleak House, the law; in Hard Times, industry; in Great Expectations, class; in Our Mutual Friend, money; the great Dickens' theme of the individual against society emerged again and again as a poignant cry.[5]

Dickens once wrote, "I am a Reformer heart and soul," but while he consistently denounced the evils in his world, he never proposed feasible alternatives to them.[6] His crusades, however, were diverse. Maybe the best statement of his sympathies is found in the introduction to Household Words, a publication that, because of its nature, afforded Dickens, as its editor, a greater forum to attack social injustice. He wrote that it [Household Words]

> consistently opposes racial, national, religious and class prejudices. It crusades against illiteracy, and in favor of government aid for public education and free elementary and industrial schools for the poor. It crusades for proper sewage disposal, cheap and unlimited water supply, and the regulation of industries vital to health. It demands the replacement of slums by decent housing for the poor, pleads for the

> establishment of playgrounds for children, and advocates systematic municipal planning. . . . It insists that industrialists must not be allowed to mutilate and kill their labourers in order to save the cost of preventing an accident. . . . it calls upon the working class to use its power to turn the 'Indifferents and the Incapable' out of Downing Street and Westminister and force the government to remedy the ills from which poor men suffer.[7]

Obviously, Household Words was to be the social conscience of Victorian England and Charles Dickens was to be the voice.

Who were the villains in Dickens' eyes? Basically, they were ostentatious and money-grubbing men whose absence of proper values, lack of altruistic emotions, and ruthless egotism had set them apart. Sometimes they were big businessmen, the new bourgeois, who advocated orthodox political economy (Ralph Nickleby, Scrooge, Jonas Chuzzlewit, Mr. Dombey, Gradgrind, and Bounderby) and who were vain and selfish, "preoccupied with superficial appearances and obsessed with the attempt to conceal their humble origins and the novelty of their wealth."[8] Yet, Dickens also attacks specific institutions: the legal system, the debtor's prison, schools, Parliament, and the Church.

However, while Dickens criticizes society's institutions, he sympathizes with those who are the unwitting victims of them. This sympathy is first with children. A retrospective glance at Dickens' novels reveals a bulk of work obsessed with the plight of the child. Starting with the autobiographical David Copperfield, Dickens worked children into his plots, often using a child as the center of the work. These were, however, usually not children from the middle class, but lost, unloved children whose lives were bleak, darkened by horrible experiences such as his childhood job in a blacking factory. It was this kind of exploitation of children that Dickens attacked as unjust.[9] In Great Expectations, Dickens wrote,

> In the little world in which children have their existence, whosoever brings them up, there is nothing so finely perceived and so finely felt as injustice. It may be only small injustice that the child can be exposed to but the child is small, and its world is small. . . . Within myself, I had sustained from my babyhood, a perpetual conflict with injustice.[10]

Dickens repeatedly reminded the English people that the "seeds of its certain ruin" were sown in the neglect of the children. He was appalled by reports showing that opium was administered to small children, and he deplored the negligent society that allowed 30,000 poor children in the streets of London to be "hunted, flogged, imprisoned" while "the Priests and Teachers of all denominations say 'Teach this!--Teach that!--Teach t'other--' and the Minister of State, though distressed by the spectacle shrugged his shoulder and replied 'It is a great wrong--BUT IT WILL LAST MY TIME!'"[11] His concern for children is further revealed in The Uncommercial Traveller:

> I could enter no other houses for that one while, for I could not bear the contemplation of the children. Such heart as I had summoned to sustain me against the miseries of the adults failed me when I looked at the children. I saw how young they

> were, how hungry, how serious, and still. I thought of them, sick and dying in those lairs. I think of them dead without anguish; but to think of them so suffering and so dying quite unmanned me.[12]

However, it is not just children who evoke such feelings in Dickens. He was "passionately on the side of anyone who was weak or oppressed"[13] and his heart "was wrung by the long hours, unhealthy conditions, and inadequate wages . . . of the working class."[14] In a speech made at Boston on February 1, 1842, on one of his American tours, Dickens reflected on his faith in the people:

> I believe that Virtue shows quite as well in rags and patches as she does in purple and fine linen. I believe that she and every beautiful object in external nature, claim some sympathy in the breast of the poorest man who breaks his scanty loaf of daily bread. I believe that she dwells rather oftener in alleys and by-ways than she does in courts and places. . . .[15]

Much of the blame for the deplorable conditions of the poor rested, Dickens believed, on the shoulders of Parliament. His distaste for that institution dates from his early career as a reporter for The Mirror of Parliament; in 1832, the times were exciting as the Reform Bill stirred the diverse passions in the English people. At that time, Dickens wrote, "we have visited it quite often enough for our purposes, and a great deal too often for our personal peace and comfort." Later, he wrote, "I suppose it is something peculiar in my constitution, but I can not imagine how any man of worth can endure the personal contemplation of the House of Commons."[16] By the 1850's, Dickens viewed English government even more contemptibly. He called Parliament a "Great Dust Heap down at Westminister" and "the dreariest failure and nuisance that ever bothered this much bothered world."[17] Government, Dickens felt, had retreated from its responsibilities, especially to the people whose discontent was "smoldering," waiting for "anyone of a thousand accidents" to turn it into "a devil of a conflagration."[18] Ignoring its paternalistic duties, the government was letting the people subside into poverty, hunger, and lethargy. As he wrote to Dr. Southwood Smith,

> . . . I greatly fear that until Governments are honest, and Parliament pure, and great men less considered, and small men more so, it is almost a Cruelty to even the dreadful hours and ways of Labor which at this time prevail. Want is so general, distress so great, and Poverty so rampant--it is, in a word, so hard for the millions to live by any means--that I scarcely know how we can step between them and one weekly farthing. . . .[19]

Even later, in a speech at Birmingham on January 6, 1860, Dickens quoted from H.T. Buckle History of Civilization in England, saying that "lawgivers are nearly always the obstructors of society instead of the helpers. . . ."[20] His general attitude was that those who governed were more concerned about appearances and official dignity than social responsibility.[21]

Dickens' novels from this period overflow with satire aimed at Parliament. The most scathing attack may appear in Bleak House where Dickens denounced corrupt elections and satirized an 1851 crisis when Lord John Russell resigned and no minister could form a Cabinet until Russell was finally returned. Dickens wrote,

"Lord Coodle would go out, Sir Thomas Doodle wouldn't come in, and there being nobody in Great Britain (to speak of) except Coodle and Doodle, there has been no Government."[22] Again in Nicholas Nickleby, Dickens registered his disgust for Parliament when Nicholas applied for a job as secretary to a member of Parliament. He quickly discovered that Mr. Gregsbury was a hypocrite; Nicholas had earlier overheard him tell a group of visitors "Thank heaven, I am a Briton . . . . I am proud of this free and happy country." But, when the visitors leave, he turned to Nicholas and told him to get together "a few little flourishing speeches of a patriotic cast" and to say good things about the people "because it comes out well at election time."[23] The only purpose of the job, it seemed, was to assemble facts about finance and foreign policy to cram into his ignorant employer so he can make the correct speeches. In Hard Times, Dickens called Parliament "a national cinder heap" and its members "national dustmen."[24] Little Dorritt also attacks members of Parliament who "fetched and carried, and toadied, and jobbed, and corrupted, and ate heaps of dirt"; he also satirizes government bureaucracy like his fictional Circumlocution Office, controlled by the Barnacle family; when a vacancy occurred, they proposed one another for the position.[25] It became an agency "dedicated to stifling and suppressing all political change and innovation."[26] In Bleak House, Dickens created Sir Leicester Dedlock, a fine old English gentleman, "only a baronet," but, "honourable obstinate . . . intensely prejudiced and unreasonable . . . ." Sir Leicester represented those who ruled England through bodies like the Court of Chancery; this baronet "regards the Court of Chancery . . . as something devised . . . by the perfection of human wisdom, for the eternal settlement of everything. . . . To give the sanction of his countenance to any complaints respecting it, would be to encourage some person in the lower classes to rise up somewhere. . . ."[27] An earlier passage from David Copperfield attacked the same kind of red tape and bureaucracy that engulfed England by comparing the country to a "trussed fowl . . . skewered through and through with office pens and bound hand and foot with red tape."[28]

As with many of his attacks against injustices, Dickens failed to offer any solution to the disagreeable situation he saw in government. His futility is voiced in an 1855 letter to Charles Macready:

> As to suffrage, I have lost hope even in the ballot. We appear to me to have proved the failure of representative institutions without an educated and advanced people to support them. . . . what with flunkyism, toadyism, letting the most contemptible lords come in for all manner of places, I do reluctantly believe that the English people are habitually consenting parties to the miserable imbecility into which we have fallen, and never will help themselves out of it. . . . At the present, we are on the down hill road to be conquered and the people WILL not bear it. . . . I have no present political faith or hope--not a grain.[29]

In addition to the government, another perpetrator of social evil was the city itself. Considered as the leading city in the world in the nineteenth century, London was a great commercial center encompassing in its boundaries a cross-section of humanity. But, Dickens tended to see and to portray London as a city he called "a vast hopeless nursery of ignorance, misery and vice."[30] He again voiced his disgust of the city in a letter to Bulwer Lytton in 1851 when he called London "a vile place."[31] This same attitude about the city is

reflected in his novels where he associated the city with death and poverty. Images of an "impure river," "a squalid maze of streets," "miserable houses," "wilderness of dirt, rags, and hunger" dot the pages of his books. The ultimate cure for the city's problem is, once again, government action, but Dickens' London, covered with fog and infected by polluted water, could get no aid from a Chancery and a Parliament that he believed resisted any change.[32]

Dickens did, however, become active in the movement to provide sanitation and public housing for London. Responding to graphic and shocking reports about public sanitation, Parliament finally established a General Board of Health in 1848. However, the Board proved inefficient, stymied by petty quarrels and administrative infighting. The lurking danger was cholera, which annually threatened the city. In fact, 1848 brought a serious outbreak that killed 14,000 in London alone, but, ironically, the Board exacerbated the situation by flushing the drains, an act which made the infection waterborne. Dickens became involved in the public health crusade through his brother-in-law, Henry Austin, who was secretary of the Metropolitan Sanitary Commission, and Dr. Thomas Southwood Smith, a friend who was also active in the movement. After this outbreak of cholera, Dickens wrote several scathing articles in The Examiner and in Household Words, and he began to make speeches, campaigning actively for improved conditions. "Education and religion can do nothing where they are most needed," Dickens argued, "until the way is paved for their ministrations by Cleanliness and Decency," In his fiction, he also treated the subject. Dombey and Son and Bleak House both advocated improved sanitation. The Board of Health eventually died along with the Palmerston ministry in 1854, but Dickens continued his advocacy of reform. In fact, his later essays in Household Words on the subject ring with radical thought. Unfortunately, while he was able to draw attention to the problem, he was not successful in finding an effective remedy for it.[33]

At the same time Dickens was lobbying for sanitary reform, he was also interested in public housing. Believing that poor housing indirectly caused physical and mental illness that crippled the poor, Dickens turned Bleak House and Household Words into a platform for various housing reforms. He convinced Miss Angela Burdette Coutts with whom he had worked in her Urania College, a home for "fallen women," to join in a project to build workingmen's housing. With some friends, Dickens chose a site, known as Nova Scotia Gardens, and hired an architect; at the same time, Miss Coutts purchased the land. The project, underway at the same time Bleak House was, proposed to build clean, inexpensive housing for the poor. However, because of money difficulties, the project was stalled for a short time, but Nova Scotia Gardens project was completed in 1859. Later, Miss Coutts built another project adjacent to the first one. Ironically, none of the model dwelling projects actually alleviated the crowded housing situation. When the model dwellings were built, they rehoused fewer people than they had evicted. For example, the Wild Court renovation project evicted around 1000 people, but rehoused only about three to four hundred of them. True to Dickens' form, he was once again instrumental in defining a serious problem, but his lack of understanding of housing problems hampered the actual solution of the problem.[34]

Other targets of Dickens' crusading were the Poor Law and the workhouses filled by that law. While Dickens declared that he was in sympathy with the intentions of the Poor Law--to cut down on able-bodied pauperism--he deplored its abuses. In a postscript to Our Mutual Friend, he wrote, "I believe there

has been in England, since the days of the Stuarts, no law so often infamously administered, no law so often openly violated, no law so habitually ill-supervised."[35] In Oliver Twist, Dickens attacked the Poor Law and its administration. Mr. Bumble, the parish beadle, runs the workhouse, an act that was in violation of the spirit of the law; the framers of this law were suspicious of the beadles, and, wanting to see them intelligently administered, provided official for workhouses. However, many parishes simply rehired the beadles and provided them with new labels. This one, Mr. Bumble, reduced the children's diet to thin gruel, another violation of the law which required that children should get nutritious food; only able-bodied paupers were to be kept on thin gruel.[36] One of the most dramatic scenes in Oliver Twist depicts this mistreatment:

> The gruel disappeared; the boys whispered to each other and winked at Oliver while his next neighbors nudged him. Child as he was, he was desperate with hunger, and reckless with misery. He rose from the table; and advancing to the master, basin and spoon in hand, said: somewhat alarmed at his own temerity: 'Please, Sir, I want some more.'

Oliver's request for more food was treated as rebellion by the masters:

> The assistants were paralyzed with wonder; the boys with fear . . . the master . . . shrieked aloud for the beadle. The board were sitting in solemn conclave when Mr. Bumble rushed into the room in quiet excitement, and addressing the gentleman in the high chair said, 'Mr. Limbkins, I beg your pardon, Sir! Oliver Twist has asked for more!' There was a general start; Horror was depicted on every countenance . . . 'That boy will be hung,' said the gentleman in the white waistcoat.[37]

Other than this mistreatment of the children, Dickens also denounced the Parish's refusal to give relief outside its walls. In all, Dickens saw the workhouse as "a conglomeration of church wardens and overseers, the instigators and the perpetrators of a bad system. Here the human spirit is systematically ground and punished into subjection."[38]

Critical, then, of the State's efforts to provide relief, Dickens turned to the church, and on church charity, he vented the same anger and frustration. The church, Dickens felt, was too concerned with people in other countries instead of those at home who had the same needs. A poignant argument for this idea was advanced in the character of Jo in Bleak House:

> It must be a strange state to be like Jo! To shuffle through the streets, unfamiliar with the shapes, and in utter darkness as to the meaning of those mysterious symbols, so abundant over the shops, and at the corners of the streets and on the doors, and in the windows! . . . Jo . . . sits down to breakfast on the door-step of the Society for the Propogation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, and gives it a brush when he has finished, as an acknowledgement of the accomodation. He admires the size of the edifice, and wonders what it's all about. He has no idea, poor wretch, of the spiritual destitution of a coral reef in the Pacific, or what it costs to look up the precious souls among the cocoa-nuts and bread fruit.[39]

At Jo's death, Dickens interjected himself into the book, saying "Dead, your Majesty. Dead, my lords and gentlemen. Dead, Right Reverends and wrong Reverends of every order. Dead, men and women, born with Heavenly compassion in your hearts. And dying thus around us every day."[40] The statement is a vicious indictment of the church and the state who ignore the poverty and starvation that surround them both.

Another social question that gripped Dickens' attention was drinking. He quarrelled with his contemporaries who averred that drinking caused social evils. Dickens disagreed, saying that poor people were not "inherently evil, but they are driven by their poverty to commit social crimes." He urged others to examine the causes of drinking instead:

> Foul smells, disgusting habitations, bad workshops, and workshop customs, want of light, air and water, the absence of all easy means of decency and health are . . . its common, everyday physical causes. The mental weariness and languor so induced, the want of wholesome relaxation, the craving for some stimulus and excitement . . . and last, and inclusive of all the rest, ignorance . . . are its most obvious moral causes.[41]

Solve these problems, Dickens claimed, and the drinking problem would disappear.

As a cure for many social problems, Dickens suggested education, but when he surveyed the kind of education offered to children, he was disappointed. The schools in Dickens' fiction illustrate what he considered as evils in educating the young. In Nicholas Nickleby, Dickens described Dotheboys Hall as an "incipient Hell." Dr. Blimber's Academy in Dombey and Son was more respectable but equally as blighting since it taught a superficial layer of knowledge that allowed the teacher to show off the child and his amount of learning. Finally, in Hard Times, the Gradgrind school demanded purely factual responses to questions. Dickens, in fact, titled the schoolroom scene in that book "Murdering the Innocents," because at Gradgrind's school, catering to the lower classes, an assembly line atmosphere prevailed. In each of these schools, teachers had no recognition of a child's emotional and intellectual needs; it was this blindness to "Fancy," as Dickens called it, that he feared.[42]

But while Dickens was concerned about all types of schooling, his greatest reform efforts were directed toward the Ragged Schools, a movement initiated by evangelicals to educate slum children. His interest in these schools dated from 1843 when he visited Field Lane School. While he supported the Ragged School endeavor, he did have certain misgivings. The schools were ill-equipped and underfunded. He wrote to Miss Coutts after his visit to one that he had

> visited Ragged School and an awful sight it is. . . . The school is held in three most wretched rooms on the first floor of a rotten house. . . . I have very seldom seen, in all the strange and dreadful things I have seen in London and elsewhere, anything so shocking as the dire neglect of the soul and body exhibited in these children. . . . The children are travelling to their graves.[43]

Dickens praised the teachers, volunteers who gave their free time to teach, for their "moral courage," especially in view of the "disheartening circumstances"

of the school. Also upset by the emphasis of religious instruction, he wrote, "To impress them, even with the idea of a God, when their own condition is so desolate, becomes a monstrous task." Deciding, however, that the Ragged Schools were better than nothing, "a slight and ineffectual palliative of an enormous evil," he became a supporter of them in Household Words, encouraging people to visit them and subscribe, a plea to which many favorably responded.[44] Hoping for further support, Dickens wrote an article for the Daily News on February 4, 1846 in which he tried to explain the purposes of the schools:

> . . . to introduce among the most miserable and neglected outcasts in London, some knowledge of the commonest principles of morality and religion; to commence their recognition as immortal creatures before the Gaol Chaplain becomes their only schoolmaster; to suggest to Society that its duty to this wretched throng, foredoomed to crime and punishment, rightfully begins at some distance from the police office. . . .[45]

He valued these schools, then as a preventive to juvenile crime and later social misbehavior.

The Ragged School experience met with bitter opposition, but Dickens persevered, writing frequently about the schools in his Household Words and sending a continual flow of letters to the Daily News. Even though his last fictional reference to the schools is an uncomplimentary one, he continued to support them as a prelude to more far reaching educational and social reforms.

The Ragged Schools did not stand alone in Dickens' condemnation. Because of their inefficiency, charity schools, which among other complaints required that their students wear uniforms, also became a Dickensonian target. Wearing a uniform, Dickens believed, marked a child as a charity case and thus isolated him from other children. In Dombey and Son, Dickens created Robin, who, because he wore a charity school uniform, was harassed by other children as he went back and forth to school.[46] Workhouse schools were even worse in Dickens' mind. In Household Words, he described a visit to a workhouse school, saying that he was "oppressed by the general air of lassistude and hopelessness, of stern discipline and poor feeding." His goal for these schools was to get them to teach industrial and farm training to the boys and domestic training to the girls.[47]

What was the solution to these educational dilemmas that Dickens anguished over? While he did not favor a system totally administered by the state, he did want the state to insure that all children got a minimum education. He explained his attitude about reform in Household Words:

> To endow such Institutions and leave the question of National Education in its present shameful state would be to maintain a cruel absurdity to which we are most strongly opposed. The compulsory industrial education of neglected children and the severe punishment of neglectful and unnatural parents are reforms to which we must come. . . . We can no more hope to make any great impressions upon crime, without these changes, than we could hope to stop the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius with a watering pot or stop its flow with a knitting needle.[48]

Even though Charles Dickens was aware of many social injustices existing in England, he never lost his faith in his country. While he was on his American trip in 1842, he wrote a letter pledging, "I love England better than I did when I left her," and in another letter, he said, ". . . I have a yearning after our English Customs and English manners, such as you cannot conceive."[49] What he tried to do, then, in his novels and other writings was not destroy the system, but to bring about reforms, believing that man could improve himself. While he could not be classified as a practical reformer, he can be credited with exposing a huge audience to social problems that they had previously ignored. Some of his contemporaries criticized his approach to social reform. For example, Thomas Carlyle scorned Dickens, taunting that his "solution to social and political wrongs was to dress up as Father Christmas and dole out enormous turkeys to impoverished victims of laissez-faire capitalism."[50] But, maybe the practicality of his solutions is not what is really important. "Ah, sir," said a cabby shortly after Dickens' death, "Mr. Dickens was the gentleman who looked after the poor man."[51] And, in looking after the poor man, Dickens became the outspoken advocate of the individual trapped by a system that ignored, even trampled, him, a system that caused the early death of the Stephen Blackpools who called life "a muddle" and who had to die to find "the God of the poor."[52] The dark and bleak world of Dickens' novels portrayed the kind of society he thought England had become. That grim, sordid world both outraged and bewildered him, but it did not dim his haunting vision of a more humane world where the cries of the Olivers, the Jos, the Stephens, and the Davids would no longer go unheeded.

NOTES

[1]Louis Francois Cazamian, The Social Novel in England, 1830-1850 (London, 1973), 4.

[2]Grahame Smith, Dickens, Money and Society (Berkeley, 1968), 147.

[3]Ibid., 210.

[4]William Harvey Marshall, The World of the Victorian Novel (New York, 1967), 83.

[5]Philip Hobsbaum, A Reader's Guide to Charles Dickens (New York, 1973), 14.

[6]Smith, Dickens, Money and Society, 160.

[7]John Lucas, The Melancholy Man (London, 1970), 202.

[8]Cazamian, The Social Novel, 108-149.

[9]Smith, Dickens, Money and Society, 85.

[10]Charles Dickens, Great Expectations (New York, 1942; first published 1861), 75.

[11]Philip Arthur Collins, Dickens and Education (London, 1964), 72.

[12]Alexander Welsh, The City of Dickens (Oxford, 1971), 13.

[13]Charles Dickens, Hard Times (London, 1966; first published 1854), xiii.

[14]Cazamian, The Social Novel, 163.

[15]K.J. Fielding, ed., The Speeches of Charles Dickens (Oxford, 1960), 19-20.

[16]Malcom Andrews, Dickens on England and the English People (New York, 1979), 103.

[17]Ibid., 110, 117.

[18]Ibid., 120.

[19]Charles Dickens to Dr. Southwood Smith, Feb. 1, 1843, Madeline House, Graham Storey, and Kathleen Tillotson, eds., The Letters of Charles Dickens (5 vols., Oxford, 1974) III, 436.

[20]Fielding, ed., Speeches, 411.

[21]Andrews, On England, 101.

[22]Charles Dickens, Bleak House (London, 1915; first published 1853), 536.

[23]Charles Dickens, Nicholas Nickleby (New York, 1944; first published 1839), 161-170.

[24]Dickens, Hard Times, 207.

[25]Charles Dickens, Little Dorritt (New York, 1953; first published 1857), 107.

[26]F.S. Schwarzbach, Dickens and the City (London, 1979), 160.

[27]Dickens, Bleak House, 9-12.

[28]Charles Dickens, David Copperfield (New York, 1943; first published 1850), 626.

[29]Charles Dickens to Charles Macready, Oct. 4, 1855, F.W. Dupee, ed., The Selected Letters of Charles Dickens (New York, 1960), 219.

[30]Welsh, The City of Dickens, 15.

[31]Andrews, On England, 76.

[32]Schwarzbaum, Dickens and the City, 139.

[33]Norris Pope, Dickens and Charity (New York, 1978), 215-242.

[34]Ibid., 234-242.

[35]Charles Dickens, Our Mutual Friend (London, 1929; first published 1865), 779.

[36]Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist (New York, 1951; first published 1837), 4-15.

[37]Ibid., 14.

[38]Hobsbaum, A Reader's Guide, 39.

[39]Dickens, Bleak House, 610.

[40]Ibid., 618.

[41]Schwarzbaum, Dickens and the City, 119.

[42]Dickens, Nicholas Nickleby, 76; Dombey and Son, 151; Hard Times, 3-8.

[43]Dickens to Miss Angela Burdett Coutts, September 16, 1843, House, Storey, and Tillotson, eds., Letters, III, 562-563.

[44]"Boys to Mend," Household Words, Henry Stone, ed., II, 422.

[45]Pope, Dickens and Charity, 153.

[46]Collins, Dickens and Education, 79.

[47]Ibid., 80-81.

[48]Ibid., 72.

[49]Dickens to Lady Holland, March 22, 1842, Storey, House, Tillotson, eds., Letters, III, 151.

[50]Andrews, On England, III.

[51]Collins, Dickens and Education, 209.

[52]Dickens, Hard Times, 273, 274.

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TO HELL WITH HABEAUS CORPUS

A unique experience occurred in American history beginning on March 24, 1942 with the removal and later incarceration of over 80,000 Japanese-American citizens. Never before had the President of the United States, by Executive Order, allowed the civil liberties of a minority group of citizens to be violated in this manner. These people were not individually accused of a crime and were not afforded the constitutional guarantee of a trial. They were interned as a group because of a myriad of complex reasons compounded by events beginning with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

Since World War II historians have agreed that the agitating forces for this mass resettlement were the military, politicians, and pressure groups. The primary motivations were fear, greed, and racism. In order to understand the magnitude of the decision, an examination of historical literature over the past fifteen years shows that it is impossible to conclude that any one, or even two, of these groups could have accomplished such a feat. It took all of them working in concert to produce Executive Order 9066 and the resulting internment of so many American citizens.

Fear, racism, and greed on the part of pressure groups prompted politicians to demand action from the military, and the military, with its own concern over the protection of the West Coast military installations and fear of invasion, completed the circle by instilling fear in the pressure groups. These pressure groups fall roughly into three categories: racist, economic, and patriotic. The most powerful spokesman for the patriots was the American Legion. Economic groups representing anti-Japanese sentiments were the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Associations of Central California, the Western Growers and Shippers, the California Farm Bureau Federation, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and the Los Angeles Merchants and Manufacturers. The racist element voiced many of its cries through the Native Sons of the Golden West and the California Joint Immigration Committee.

The Yellow Peril attitude of the racists toward the Chinese was transferred to the Japanese immigrants as early as 1900. Even though there were only 24,326 Japanese in the entire United States, they were pictured by the West Coast States as hordes of coolies. They were viewed as tricky, unreliable, and dishonest people who were taking jobs from White Americans. Anti-Japanese propaganda increased during the Russo-Japanese War and by June, 1905 the anti-Japanese forces consolidated into the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League. Many of the League members and officials also belonged to the Native Sons of The Golden West, an organization dedicated to exclusion of Orientals.[1]

By 1920 aliens were forbidden to lease land, to purchase stock in any organization which owned or leased agricultural land, and they were no longer allowed to purchase land in the name of their citizen children. By 1923 this land law was extended to prohibit Japanese aliens from sharecropping. Shortly before the Immigration Act of 1924 another organization was formed which consisted of, among others, the Grand President of the Native Sons of The Golden West, Mr. V.S. McClatchy. McClatchy was also editor and owner of the racist newspaper,

the Sacramento Bee. This new organization, the California Joint Immigration Committee, became by 1927 the most powerful single racist group in California. This nativist organization made sure that exclusion against the Japanese was retained. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, these anti-Japanese forces of the West Coast began to talk in terms of non-assimilation and the "un-Americanism" of dual citizenship.[2] After Pearl Harbor the xenophobia of many white Californians shared the Immigration Committee's view that the Japanese problem was now a national one and, like the Native Sons, decided it was time to get done what should have been accomplished a quarter of a century ago.[3]

The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor gave credence to racist groups' views that the Japanese were a sneaky, diabolical race of people. This was quickly becoming the West Coast's opinion in December of 1941 where over 117,000 Japanese lived in what would later be termed as military areas. Because of physical appearance and cultural differences, the alien and Japanese-American citizens were thought of as a mass group and not as individuals. The immigrant alien Issei, the Japanese educated Kibei, and the American born Nisei were considered still loyal to the Emperor. They would fight for their country either in front of or behind enemy lines.[4] Associate Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, Chairman of President Roosevelt's special investigating commission on the cause of the disaster at Pearl Harbor, indicated that the attack was planned well before Japan broke diplomatic relations with the United States and was aided by fifth column activities in Hawaii.[5] The Roberts Report added impetus to West Coast pressure groups who insisted it was impossible to distinguish between loyal and disloyal Japanese.

The question of loyalty intensified in mid-February of 1942 as the allies' military situation continued to deteriorate in the Pacific.

> Japan . . . had taken most of the Phillipines, Hong Kong, Thailand, Wake and Guam Islands, Surawak, Tarakan, and other sections of Borneo, Moulmein in Burma, outlying Dutch and Australian possessions, and the Malay Peninsula up to Singapore Island - and Singapore was to surrender on the fifteenth of February.[6]

Losses in the Pacific coincided with several strong anti-Japanese press releases. On February 5, 1942 the House on Un-American Activities, or the Dies Committee, released its "Yellow Paper" revealing West Coast fifth column activity. Walter Lippman, on February 12, wrote a syndicated column titled "The Fifth Column on the Coast." His opinion was that since there was no important sabotage as yet on the Coast, that such activities were being held back for one tremendous attack. As a result of the gravity of the situation, Lippman advocated setting aside the civil rights of Japanese-American citizens. Four days later Eastern columnist Westbrook Pegler, a conservative right-wing journalist, wrote that all Japanese in California should be under armed guard and "to hell with habeaus corpus."[7]

Racism, fed by war hysteria, soon began to have its affect on economic special interest groups. The wholesale produce markets in Los Angeles wanted to eliminate their Japanese competitors. "White American" nurserymen organized a boycott of Japanese firms.[8] The Grower-Shipper Association, which was almost a subsidiary of the larger Western Growers, published a brochure entitled NO JAPS NEEDED to assure Californians they would not go hungry without the Japanese

truck farmers. This White growers association leased lands which produced fresh vegetables the year around in Salinas, Imperial and Salt River Valleys for Eastern markets, as did the Japanese. The Salinas Valley alone produced half of the head lettuce sold in the country's produce markets.[9]

The extent to which the Japanese were cutting into White farmers and laborers was examined in a series of hearings by Congressman John H. Tolan and the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration in the West Coast Area. According to the Tolan Committee Report, Japanese farming occupied 43 percent of the gainfully employed in the three Pacific States and 24 percent were engaged in wholesale and retail trades.[10] In 1941 California-Japanese farmers grew 42 percent of the State acreage in commercial truck crops which was valued at approximately $100,000,000 for both the fresh market and processing. The Japanese operated 3.9 percent of all farms in the State. They harvested only 2.7 percent of all cropland, but as laborers and owners they produced:

> Ninety percent or more of the following crops: snapbeans for marketing; celery, spring and summer; peppers; strawberries. Fifty to ninety percent of the following: artichokes; snapbeans for canning; cauliflower; celery, fall and winter; cucumbers; fall peas; spinach; tomatoes. Twenty-five to fifty percent of the following: asparagus, cabbage, cantaloupes, carrots, lettuce, onions, and watermelons.[11]

It is significant to note that these percentages represent in monetary value between 30 and 35 percent of all commercial truck crops grown in California.[12] Considering the monetary value of the Japanese commercial truck crops, it is important to relate this to the location of the farms in California and the economic pressure groups who demanded Japanese relocation.

Nearly 30 percent of all commercial truck farms were located in Los Angeles County, while almost 85 percent were in Alameda, Fresno, Imperial, Monterey, Orange, Peaser, Sacramento, San Diego, San Joaquin, Santa Clara and Tulare.[13] It was from these counties that much of the anti-Japanese agitation arose. With the outbreak of the war, the California State Farm Bureau appointed a committee to investigate the Japanese problem. Following the investigation, the Bureau recommended that all alien and citizen Japanese be put under federal supervision. In February the Los Angeles County directors of the Farm Bureau unanimously passed a resolution stating that all alien and citizen Japanese be confined to concentration camps in the interest of national defense.[14] The loss of Japanese agricultural products was not a factor to many. Representing the agriculturists in Monterey County, H.L. Strobel told the Tolan Committee:

> I believe that the American farmers, or the farmers of California, are entirely capable, and with the land now occupied by Japanese, will produce in just as large a quantity the vegetables that have been formerly produced by the Japanese in our farming areas.[15]

The California Chambers of Commerce concurred with the California Farm Bureau. The California Chambers of Commerce through its Agricultural Committee

recommended on December 22, 1941 that all Japanese nationals be put under federal control. In February the Los Angeles chapter as a group went on record as advocating the removal of all Japanese to an area some fifty miles from the Coast and the Mexican border.[16] Removal of the Japanese would be advantageous not only to the White farmer but also to the wholesale and retail business in Los Angeles. The largest metropolitan produce distributing center west of Chicago was located in Los Angeles and controlled by a Japanese syndicate.[17] The California attitude toward this situation and the Japanese farmer is best described in the Tolan Committee hearing by a representative of the Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers of Los Angeles:

> . . . I have talked to many wholesale growers of vegetables for the local market who have either gone out of business in the past ten years or greatly reduced their operations due to Japanese competition. . . .
>
> A comprehensive system of associations set up for these small Japanese farmers has enabled them to regulate market supplies and reduce prices at will, to the point the White grower has been forced out of production. However, there is a vast reserve of skilled White farmers who will resume the production of vegetables whenever they have any idea that it can be done without going up against this type of Japanese competition. . . .[18]

An analysis of what the Japanese lost monetarily as a result of evacuation shows what the economic groups had to gain from Japanese relocation. According to W.R.A. Chief of Evacuee Property, Mr. Russell Robinson, the Japanese left some $200,000,000 worth of real, personal and commercial property. Many leaseholding farm evacuees lost these leases to other races. In 1945 Japanese farm ownership was about 30 percent of their total pre-war farm operations. What remained for the total pre-war Japanese landholders and leaseholders was about 60,000 acres or less than 0.002 of all farms in the West Coast States.[19] This is more than a considerable loss of acreage. The pre-war land acreage in California, Washington, and Oregon was 258.074 acres.[20] In order for the West Coast economic groups to assume Japanese land and other holdings, which could only be accomplished by their evacuation, it was necessary to put pressure on their politicians.

The first official body to make issue of the alien and Japanese American citizen was the California legislature. On January 17, 1942 the Senate passed two resolutions: one called for an investigation of the California Alien Land Law and the second for the creation of an investigating committee to study employment of Japanese-American citizens by the State. The first resolution argued that the White and Oriental races were socially and economically incompatible. It also pointed out that aliens were in control of large land areas near vital installations which created a menace to national defense, citizens of the State, nation, and the American vegetable and fruit grower and dealer. The second resolution was to prevent employment of anyone who proved disloyal to the United States. This measure was directed at workers who possessed dual citizenship--in other words, the Japanese.[21]

The first resolution concerning the Alien Land Law is not difficult to understand considering the pressure from racists and economic groups. However,

the second resolution concerning employment of the disloyal is more complex. The situation that many politicians found themselves in can perhaps best be seen through California Attorney General Earl Warren's statement a few weeks after Pearl Harbor. He said, "The Japanese situation . . . may well be the Achilles' heel of the entire civilian defense effort."[22] On February 2, Warren told a conference of Sheriffs and district attorneys that the lack of fifth column activity and sabotage made it appear that the Japanese were waiting until "the zero hour arrived."[23] However, on February 7, Warren wrote Assemblyman Thomas A. Maloney concerning the legality of the state Personnel Board barring from Civil Service examinations anyone who descended from nationals of countries with which the United States was at war. Warren stated the refusal to accept these people was discriminatory and a violation of civil liberties.[24] But 1942 was an election year for many politicians and for Earl Warren a governorship was pending.

Warren did not have a real state political machine, so sheriffs and district attorneys of California were his real political base.[25] During the February conference, Warren was able to feel out his own constituents and to get the temper of Californians at the local level. Two weeks later when he testified before the Tolan Committee, Warren was less concerned with civil liberties and more concerned with sabotage, espionage, the inability to determine the loyal from the disloyal Japanese, and the possibility of vigilante action.

At the San Francisco Tolan Committee hearings, Warren testified:

> . . . Throughout the Santa Maria Valley and including the cities of Santa Maria and Guadalupe every utility, airfield, bridge, telephone, and power line or other facility of importance, is flanked by Japanese, and even surround the oil fields in this area . . . law enforcement officers do not know which of these Japanese are American citizens and which are aliens.[26]

As part of his prepared statement, Warren read before the Committee a communication from C.B. Harrall, Chief of Police of Los Angeles, on the question of loyalty:

> After thorough and complete investigation of the relationship existing between parents and children, and the tendencies of the American-born Japanese, I feel that they present as difficult, if not more difficult, problem than the enemy alien.[27]

Warren also commented on the possibility of vigilante action:

> . . . there are many, many Japanese who are now roaming around . . . the Western States in a condition that will unquestionably bring about race riots and prejudice and hysteria and excesses of all kinds.[28]

All of the groups represented at the Tolan Committee hearings who expressed these same fears as Warren believed that complete evacuation was necessary for the protection of the Japanese and because it was a military necessity.[29] During the second week in January, public pressure began to react at a higher level.

Congressman Leland Ford of Los Angeles became the first politician on the national level to become involved in the Japanese question. After receiving a letter from a prominent, though not named, Hollywood actor suggesting legislation to remove all Japanese truck farmers from the California coastline inland, Ford wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull and seven other executive officials that he agreed with the proposal. He was informed by Attorney General Francis Biddle that this was not possible unless the writ of habeaus corpus was suspended. Ford then suggested the Army and Navy be given the authority to remove all persons who might be harmful to the safety and welfare of the country from strategic areas. By February 9, Ford was advocating mass internment.[30]

Until February 2, 1942, the West Coast congressmen like Ford were acting on the Japanese problem alone. On January 30, 1942, at a Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce meeting several West Coast congressmen were invited to hear addresses given by Charles Nardoff, co-author of Mutiny On the Bounty, and Captain Lowell Limpus, a newspaper columnist. Both speakers urged for evacuation of all Japanese. The result of this meeting was the Costello Resolution which was presented before a congressional caucus asking the War Department to have immediate and complete charge over all alien enemies and those holding dual citizenship. It also called for mass evacuation of all enemy aliens and their families. Those people holding dual citizenship would be given the opportunity and federal assistance for voluntary resettlement.[31]

Three days later the entire West Coast Congressional Delegation met. Senator Hiram Johnson appointed two committees from the West Coast delegation. Senator Rufus C. Holman of Oregon headed the committee for defense of the West Coast, and Senator C. Wallgren of Washington was head of the committee dealing with enemy aliens and sabotage control of the West Coast. Senator Wallgren's committee eliminated the question of citizenship and based its decision on loyalty alone. It recommended using the authority of the Army for partial or complete evacuation of strategic areas which would be determined by the military. Senator Holman's committee recommended the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens, considered dangerous from strategic areas. This committee considered the entire states of California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska as strategic areas. These recommendations dated February 13, 1942 were sent to President Roosevelt.[32]

There were many interrelating factors that caused the West Coast congressmen to make such strong recommendations to the President of the United States. As already indicated, pressure groups motivated by fear, racism, and greed, were increasingly persistent. Local officials and political figures through sincere concern and the desire to pacify their constituents pressed for a solution to the Japanese problem. The news media fanned the emotional spark of fear into a raging flame. The war in the Pacific was going badly for the Allies. West Coast Americans were rapidly losing confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice to handle the Japanese problem. To satisfy these people there was only one recourse--to declare the Japanese problem a military necessity. On February 19, 1942, Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066 which gave the Secretary of War and those military commanders he might designate the right to declare any area they deemed necessary as strategic and remove any person therein.[33] Secretary of War Stimson assigned the Western Defense Commander, General John L. Dewitt, to carry out the Executive Order.

General DeWitt was affected by the agitating groups in their demand for the removal of all Japanese from the West Coast and, in his desire to protect the West Coast area, he also had an affect on the agitating groups. The two common elements the agitating groups shared with the West Coast military were racism and the geographic concentration of the Japanese.

As early as January 29, 1942, DeWitt agreed with Admiral Truma, head of the West Coast Naval Defense, that all aliens and Japanese-American citizens should be removed from Bainbridge Island because of the shipbuilding plant there.[34] Concerning this issue, DeWitt reported to General Provost Marshal Gullion the same day: ". . . but you know there is one group and a large group want to move them entirely out of the State, another group wants to move them to the Middle West. . . ."[35] This "large group" which was secretly organizing as a special interest group to force federal action was the West Coast congressmen.[36] These congressmen and coastal political leaders aided the military geographic argument. The previously-cited statement by Warren to the Tolan Committee on February 21, 1942 is almost identically worded in DeWitt's June 5, 1943 "Final Report" to the War Department on the Japanese evacuation. DeWitt then stated:

> Throughout the Santa Maria Valley and including the cities of Santa Maria and Guadalupe every utility, airfield, bridge, telephone, and power line or other facility of importance is flanked by Japanese. . . .[37]

The geographic concentration of Japanese aliens and citizens bred concern in the military when coupled with the fear of sabotage and possible invasion of the West Coast. Between December 20 to December 23, 1941, Japanese submarines fired on three American tankers and one freighter, sinking the tanker Emidis. On January 25, 1942, enemy submarines were again sighted off the Pacific coast.[38] These events tended to support DeWitt's December 11, 1941 announcement that there were 34 Japanese ships between San Francisco and Los Angeles; also, the December 13 rumor that the main Japanese fleet was 164 miles off San Francisco. However, DeWitt's reports were never documented.[39]

DeWitt was convinced that an invasion was imminent and the 20,000 Japanese in the San Francisco Bay area would rise to support Japan. On December 19, 1941, he passed these concerns to Washington and recommended that all enemy aliens be interned. This proposal for all enemy aliens was never acted upon because of obvious political reasons. There were approximately 700,000 Italian and 300,000 German aliens in the West Coast area.[40] As late as January 31, 1942, DeWitt was still pushing for evacuation of all enemy aliens on the West Coast as a preventive action against sabotage; only, by this date he included Japanese-American citizens as well.[41]

On February 3, 1942, DeWitt talked to Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall. After a conference with the Governor of California and several representatives from the Departments of Justice and Agriculture, DeWitt told Marshall that the people of California were very disturbed over the aliens and wanted to get them out of several communities. DeWitt indicated his only concern was the protection of military installations. The same day Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy admonished DeWitt not to discuss wholesale evacuation of Japanese citizens and aliens with political figures. DeWitt then told McCloy of his telephone conversation with General Marshall in which Marshall

concurred in advocating removal of Japanese aliens from areas in California which were considered combat zones. According to DeWitt this movement would be accomplished with the aid of California Governor Culbert L. Olson.[42]

Five days prior to these two conversations with the War Department, the Attorney General, on DeWitt's recommendation, began designating prohibited zones containing vital installations. Within a few days there were 99 such zones which were off limits to all aliens of enemy nationality. The largest of these zones were the waterfronts of San Francisco, San Diego, Wilmington, and Terminal Island. Aside from these military areas there was a large portion of Los Angeles City and County, amounting to a 40 square mile area which was also now classified as a prohibited area.[43] After the Attorney General's action, it seems reasonable that the military and those West Coast people who so greatly feared invasion, espionage, and sabotage would be pacified; however, this was not a reasonable time. By the second week in February all groups advocating the removal of enemy aliens and Japanese-American citizens intensified their actions on both the War Department and the Justice Department.

Bowing to pressure, Attorney General Biddle established 135 separate areas in California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona as prohibited areas to all enemy aliens by February 15. He also declared a curfew for reconstructed areas for all enemy aliens and placed travel restrictions of five miles from their homes.[44] These actions did not please West Coast economic groups, politicians, or the military. California farmers did not want more Japanese moving into their lands and cited sabotage and fear of vigilantism as their reasons.[45] West Coast politicians were not eager to disrupt the large number of German and Italian aliens. The military was concerned over Biddle's lack of total exclusion from most of the West Coast aircraft factories. Biddle would not acquiesce because he held to the premise that his Department did not have the constitutional right to go further.[46]

Once Biddle refused to exceed his authority as Attorney General of the United States other means had to be found to remove those who were the cause of West Coast fear, racism, and greed--the Japanese-American citizen. On December 11, 1941, Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall declared the West Coast and Alaska a "Theater of Operations." Biddle wrote to Secretary of War Stimson on February 12, 1942, that the evacuation of Japanese citizens would have to be based on military considerations which was the responsibility of the Army, not the Justice Department.[47] Unknowingly, both Marshall and Biddle set the action for the final travesty. Two days before Biddle's letter to Stimson, Tom Clark from the Justice Department, Los Angeles Mayor Fletcher Bowran, California Attorney General Warren, and General DeWitt met to settle the Japanese problem. They concluded it was a military, not civilian, problem. The West Coast Congressional Delegation, on February 13, pressed the President for the Evacuation of all persons of Japanese descent. DeWitt, as Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, forwarded to Secretary of War Stimson on February 14, his final recommendation on the subject of "Evacuation of Japanese and Other Subversive Persons From the Pacific Coast."[48]

DeWitt's final recommendation explains the military fears of Japanese attack, sabotage, and espionage. It also expresses the same racial hatred of the Japanese that was exhibited by the nativists, the economic pressure groups, and the politicians:

> The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized,' the racial strains are undiluted. . . . It, therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies of Japanese extraction are at large today. There are indications that these are organized and ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken.[49]

DeWitt urged exclusion of Japanese aliens, Japanese-American citizens, other enemy aliens, and any other suspect subversives from military areas decided upon at his discretion. At this point DeWitt advised internment for all aliens and subversives. The Japanese-American citizen had the opportunity to accept voluntary internment.[50]

At the time of DeWitt's final recommendation, the President was also being urged by Secretary of War Stimson, the West Coast Delegation, West Coast officials and organizations, the press, and the radio to make a decision on the Japanese problem. This was a critical time for Roosevelt. The war had to be won. It was imperative to keep unity at home to win the peace or become another Woodrow Wilson. And he had to keep his own political party intact. With these three objectives in mind, Roosevelt chose not to avoid the Japanese problem, but responded in a manner in which he excelled--by playing "broker politics." In signing Executive Order No. 9066, Roosevelt authorized the Secretary of War to choose the military commanders who would, at their discretion, determine which areas would be considered military and any persons who would be excluded from these areas. The Secretary of War or the military commanders would provide "such transportation, food shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary."[51]

The Secretary of War designated Western Defense Commander John DeWitt to implement Executive Order No. 9066. From this moment the fate of some 80,000 Japanese-American citizens was determined. The removal and eventual internment of American citizens was now legal through Presidential proclamation and by military necessity. Agitation from the racists, pressure groups, and the military succeeded in placing any American citizen under the complete control of the military during war-time. This small, politically powerless group of West Coast Japanese-American citizens were the victims of racism, greed, and fear emanating from the racists, pressure groups, and the military.

In examining the three agitating groups responsible for the Japanese-American evacuation during World War II, it may be concluded that no single, or even two, groups of anti-Japanese could have succeeded in a feat of this magnitude. In order for this violation of civil liberties to take place, it is necessary to cite these combined forces: the waning course of the war in the Pacific with the steadily increasing pressure from the agitating groups. The deteriorating condition in the South Pacific, the agitation of the racists, pressure groups, and the military working in concert, produced the attitude assumed by many on the West Coast--to hell with habeaus corpus.

NOTES

[1]U.S., Department of Interior, War Relocation Authority, Wartime Exile: The Exclusion of the Japanese-Americans From The West Coast (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 11, 13. Hereafter cited as WRA, Wartime Exile.

[2]Ibid., 15-16.

[3]Jacobus ten Brock, Edward N. Burnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, Prejudice, War, and the Constitution (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), 46. Hereafter cited as ten Brock, Burnhart, and Matson, Prejudice, War, and the Constitution; WRA, Wartime Exile, 28.

[4]WRA, Wartime Exile, 54.

[5]Martin Grozins, Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 44-48. Hereafter cited as Grozins, Americans Betrayed.

[6]WRA, Wartime Exile, 126.

[7]Ibid., 116, 126-127.

[8]Carey McWilliams, "California and the Japanese," The New Republic, CVI (March 1942), 296. Hereafter cited as McWilliams, "California and the Japanese."

[9]Frank J. Taylor, "The People Nobody Wants," Saturday Evening Post, (May 1942), 24-25, 64-67. Hereafter cited as Taylor, "The People Nobody Wants."; Grozins, Americans Betrayed, 22, 26.

[10]U.S. Congress, House, Tolan Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, H. Rept. 2124, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942, Part I, Sect. 8: 101. Hereafter cited as Tolan Committee.

[11]Ibid., 117.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Grozins, Americans Betrayed, 31-32.

[15]Tolan Committee, H. Rept. 2124, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942, Part I, Sect. E, 8: 144.

[16]Grozins, Americans Betrayed, 34.

[17]Taylor, "The People Nobody Wants," 66.

[18]Tolan Committee, H. Rept. 2124, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942, Part I, Sect. E, 8: 145.

[19]U.S. Department of Interior, War Relocation Authority, The Wartime Handling of Evacuee Property (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 108. Hereafter cited as WRA, Evacuee Property.

[20]Tolan Committee, H. Rept. 2124, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942, Part I, Sect. D, 8: 121.

[21]ten Brock, Barnhart, and Matson, Prejudice, War, and the Constitution, 75-77.

[22]John D. Weaver, Warren: The Man, The Court, The Era, (Batson: J.B. Lippencott Co., 1967), 105.

[23]Ibid., 105.

[24]Ibid., 106.

[25]Ibid., passim.

[26]Tolan Committee, H. Rept. 2124, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942, Part I, Sect. E, 8: 140.

[27]Ibid., 142.

[28]Ibid., 146.

[29]Ibid., 147.

[30]Grozins, Americans Betrayed, 64-66.

[31]Ibid., 69.

[32]Tolan Committee, H. Rept. 1911, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942, 8: 3.

[33]Tolan Committee, H. Rept. 2124, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942, Appendix, 314.

[34]Roger Daniels, The Decision to Relocate the Japanese-Americans, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott Co., 1976), 73-74. Hereafter cited as Daniels, Decision to Relocate Japanese.

[35]Ibid., 75.

[36]Ibid., 41-42.

[37]Grozins, Americans Betrayed, 284-285.

[38]WRA, Wartime Exile, 106-107.

[39]Daniels, Decision to Relocate Japanese, 14.

[40]Ibid., 15.

[41]Ibid., 81.

[42]Ibid., 91-95.

[43]WRA, Evacuee Property, 11-13.

[44]Daniels, Decision to Relocate Japanese, 43.

[45]McWilliams, "California and the Japanese," 295.

[46]Daniels, Decision to Relocate Japanese, 43.

[47]Ibid., 107, 163.

[48]WRA, Wartime Exile, 125, 128-129.

[49]Ibid., 129.

[50]Ibid., 130-131.

[51]Tolan Committee, H. Rept. 2124, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942, 8: Appendix, 314-315.

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TITUS OATES:

AUTHOR OF THE POPISH PLOT

When violence and factions are the order of the day, and a court system prevails which gives credence to rumor and hearsay, plotting and the discovery of plots naturally become the major occupations of the time. Such was the situation in England during the fall of 1678. The populace was generally suspicious and distrustful of the restored monarch Charles II. The rise of arbitrary government seemed manifested in the actions of Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby, Charles' Lord Treasurer. Also, the fear of popery was intensified by the presence of James, Duke of York, a Catholic convert, brother to Charles and successor to the throne. When Danby and James joined forces in their political policies, the atmosphere became even tenser. This situation laid the groundwork for one of the most astute informers of the time, Titus Oates.[1]

Though Titus Oates was undoubtedly a "lying madman," his fabricated tale of a fiendish Popish Plot made him a national hero and resulted in the execution of numerous innocent people. His background of perjury should have been sufficient to invalidate his statements; however, the prevailing popular feeling of animosity toward Papists and the political situation insured his success as an informer. Charles' reluctance to discount Oates' testimony evidences the power of popular sentiment during this period. Even after the King successfully caught Oates in several obvious lies relating to the supposed plot, he could not overlook the accusations for fear of being accused of Catholic sympathy. Oates' initial success may be attributed to popular sentiment, but his continued success was related more closely to the political use made of his plot.[2]

Although Oates received some measure of popularity in 1678, he had not been well received in the past. He was an extremely unattractive person as evidenced by a description of his being "squat, bull-necked, bow-legged, and with a jaw so enormous that his mouth appeared to be hideously in the middle of his fact."[3] His grotesque appearance was equalled by his unsavory background. Born in 1649, Titus inherited heterodox leanings from his father Samuel Oates, an active Anabaptist during the Interregnum and later the rector of a church in Hastings after the Restoration. Both Westminster School and Cambridge expelled Titus from their premises after only a short time in residence. Though he never mastered Latin, he took holy orders after leaving Cambridge and received a curacy in Surrey and later a vicarage in Kent in 1673. Oates was forced to leave Kent on a charge of drunkenness. Shortly thereafter the Privy Council charged him with perjury for falsely accusing a young boy of sodomy and the boy's father of treasonable remarks.[4]

Deeming it profitable to remove himself for a time, Oates signed on as chaplain for a frigate bound for Tangier in May 1675. On its return, Oates was dismissed for homosexual practices. This somewhat explained his mysterious expulsions from previous positions. In 1677, he served for three months as chaplain to the Protestant members of the Earl of Norwich's London household before being dismissed. Immediately thereafter he entered the Roman Catholic Church, a conversion he later insisted was insincere. In spite of the patronage of Richard Strange, the English Provincial of the Society of Jesus, he failed

again. His grotesque appearance, age, proven homosexuality, and ignorance of Latin were not conducive to success in the Spanish, French or English Jesuit schools to which he was sent. Finally, in June 1678 Thomas Whitbread, who replaced Strange as Provincial, expelled Oates once again.[5]

Angered at the rejection by the Jesuits, Oates decided to use to his advantage the knowledge he had acquired during his brief association with them in fabricating a Popish Plot which could reinstate him in the good graces of his alternate faith. It was at this point that he renewed an earlier association with Dr. Israel Tonge, a Church of England rector who had for many years tried to discover an actual popish plot against the throne. By convincing Tonge that he had been hired by the Jesuits to poison him because of his translation of a book entitled The Jesuits' Morals, Oates established a staunch ally in the person of Tonge. Relying on his recent association with the Jesuits, Oates, with the aid of Tonge, drew up a set of forty-three articles outlining an alleged papist conspiracy against England and King Charles II. The number eventually grew to eighty-one. The plot invented was less than original. It was similar to earlier stories such as the Habernfeld Plot and Prynne's interpretation of the Civil War, but was redesigned to fit the time of Oates.[6]

In short, the plot was structured as follows. The Pope was the leader of the conspiracy and had commissioned the Society of the Jesuits to carry out his plan to punish England and its sovereign for denouncing the true faith. The King was to be either stabbed by Irish ruffians, shot by Jesuits, or poisoned by Sir George Wakeman, the Queen's physician, and Edward Coleman, Secretary to the Duchess of York. Oates claimed knowledge of specific amounts paid for these services. In addition, the Catholics in London were to carry out a general murder of all Protestants in England. With the disposal of Charles, the Pope planned to offer the crown to James, Duke of York, who was to follow the commands of the Pope or be replaced by someone who would. Other bedlam revealed by the Articles included the destruction of English commerce, a French invasion of Ireland, and Jesuits disguised as Presbyterians were to stir up revolt in Scotland. Other major figures implicated besides the Pope were the King of France; the General of the Jesuits; Jesuit Provincials in England, Spain, and Ireland; and Archbishops and Rectors of Jesuit Colleges.[7]

Using Tonge as his agent, Oates began his path to the King and Parliament. Since Tonge had no way of directly contacting the King, he used an acquaintance, Christopher Kirkby, as a go-between. Kirkby, who was in some way employed as a chemist by the court, knew the schedule of the King and contacted him on August 13, 1678. As supposed plots were a common occurrence, the King paid little notice and referred Kirkby to his secretary, William Chiffinch. Refusing to be dismissed, Kirkby took Tonge directly to the King later that same day, at which time they were referred to Lord Treasurer Danby. This meeting with Danby was perhaps the first stroke of luck for Oates since Danby decided to make use of the situation. Danby agreed to further investigation of the plot because he hoped to improve his standing with Parliament and felt that a possible conspiracy might persuade them to appropriate money and arms for protection at the next session. Thus far Parliament had refused to concede to Danby and the King in this request for fear that a standing army might make them strong enough to rule without their aid. Also, James joined with Danby in support of the investigation hoping to expose the allegations as false and thereby exonerate his fellow Roman Catholics.[8] James had no fear of implication since Oates' story was designed for Anglicans and the court and against

Dissenters. Oates later went so far as to give positive testimony that James was not a party to the conspiracy.[9]

On September 28th Oates had his first chance to gain fame as an informer. The Privy Council, presided over by the King, began investigating the matter. Letters to James' Jesuit confessor Father Bedingfield, whom Tonge had suggested would substantiate his claim, were pronounced forgeries; Tonge was called before the Council and announced that all he knew had come from Oates. Oates was called to appear before the afternoon session, from which the King was absent. Immediately he identified the letters as to specific authors and proceeded to give detailed dimensions to his earlier outlined plot. He claimed to have secured this first-hand knowledge while living among the Jesuits for the sole purpose of spying on them. His quick answers and the minute detail offered greatly impressed the Council. Oates became so firmly established in the confidence of the Council that the King was unable to prove him a perjurer even after proving him false in some of his detailed description on the following day. That day the Council ordered the arrest of Coleman, the first of many arrests based on the fabrications of Oates. A third day of testimony was given in which Oates increased his charges to include:

> . . . twenty-four English Jesuits, nineteen foreign Jesuits, twelve Scottish Jesuits, nine Benedictines, three Carmelites, two Franciscans, nine Dominicans, fourteen secular priests, four secular persons, four Irish ruffians, and two archbishops.[10]

By October 5th the plot was known by the entire populace. Oates was considered a national hero, and the Council started disarming Papists and arresting persons accused by Oates. Thus, the persecution of Catholics and especially Jesuits began. Many fled the country. Houses were searched and businesses ruined. Prisons became filled with those who would not take the oath of allegiance and supremacy. Severe laws not normally enforced were used against the papist community. Oates was lodged in Whitehall under guard for protection and granted a pension of twelve-hundred pounds a year for his efforts. While a few doubted the truth of his fantastic statements, those who hated the Catholics were eager to believe his lies. Rumors were circulated to incite a general state of terror among the people. Men and women alike went armed. Soon everyone was reluctant to disagree with Oates for fear of being labeled a Papist.[11] By November 30, 1678 all the Popish Lords were expelled from the House by refusing to swear to the Parliamentary Test Act, with the exception of three who did. Those in the Commons did take the oath.[12]

Oates' position was further enhanced by two events which seemed to substantiate his statements. The first was the seizure of treasonable letters written by Coleman, Secretary to the Duchess of York, to French Jesuits. While there was nothing in them about murder or conspiracy, they did allude to the day that James would succeed his brother upon the throne and the ultimate rise of Roman Catholicism in England with the help of French money. These statements were looked upon by the Council as supporting proof of the conspiracy revealed by Oates. It has been noted that Coleman was perhaps the only one of Oates' victims who was truly guilty of a crime.[13] The importance of this event is revealed by a contemporary John Evelyn, in speaking about the much later trial of William Howard, Viscount Stafford:

> Such a man's testimony should not be taken against the life of a dog. But the merit of something material which he discovered against Coleman, put him in such esteem with the Parliament, that now, I fancy, he stuck at nothing, and thought everybody was to take what he said for gospel.[14]

The second event beneficial to Oates was the disappearance of Sir Edmund Godfrey. Godfrey, a staunch Protestant magistrate, had witnessed the depositions of Oates earlier in September. In the middle of October he vanished, and five days later his body was discovered. Even before the discovery, it was rumored that he had been murdered by Papists. Though the actual mystery of his death has never been solved, this incident added fuel to the fire that Oates had already set. Godfrey's body was found with his own sword through it, but medical examination revealed that he had been previously strangled. Rumors spread that Godfrey had been murdered by Papists because he had helped in publishing their plot. The Country Party--later known as Whigs--led by Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftsbury, seized on the opportunity to stir up anti-Catholic feeling against the monarchy. The chief aim of this group was to secure a Protestant succession to the throne. By pointing out the horror of a Catholic monarch, his group hoped to discredit Charles, James and Danby and break up the existing House of Commons. Godfrey's corpse was used to add to the panic already initiated by Oates. It was exhibited for public view and guards were posted to protect the minister who performed the funeral ceremony. Even though Shaftsbury may not have been a party to Oates' original plot, he used it to the fullest extent to gain his own objectives.[15]

Opposing the Country Party were the Tories or supporters of the monarch. The Tories as well as Charles could not afford to openly refute the accusations made by Oates for fear of being added to his next list of conspirators. On November 9, 1678, in his speech to both houses Charles, in essence, agreed to support the Catholic persecution which was to follow for the next two years. He did stress, however, that any measures taken should not interfere with the rightful succession of James to the throne when he stated:

> And therefore I am come to assure you, that whatsoever Bills you shall present, to be passed into laws, to make you safe in the reign of my Successor, (so they tend not to impeach the Right of Succession, nor the descent of the crown in the true line; and so as they restrain not my power, nor the just rights of any Protestant Successor.) shall find from me a ready concurrence. And I desire you withal, to think of some effectual means for the conviction of Popish Recusants, and to expedite your councils as fast as you can, that the world may see our unanimity, and that I may have an opportunity of showing you how ready I am to do anything that may give comfort and satisfaction to such dutiful and loyal subjects."[16]

On this wave of popular sentiment, Oates' reputation grew and he continued to invest new incriminating evidence to insure his position. At this point other disreputable informers sought to share in Oates' rewards by confirming his statements and adding their own details. More and more people were accused. Any connection with the Catholic faith left persons open to attack. On November 24, 1678, Oates went so far as to openly accuse the Queen of being a party to the conspiracy to murder her husband and to having arranged the assassination

of Godfrey. Oates was encouraged by the Country Party which had long been in favor of the King's divorcing Catherine who was a Catholic. His subsequent marriage to a Protestant they hoped would insure a Protestant succession. Though Charles was known to be unfaithful to Catherine, he proved loyal in this instance and would not permit her to fall victim to Oates. Having considerable support in the House of Lords, Catherine was exonerated. Severe cross-examination of Oates and the other major informer, William Bedloe, exposed considerable inconsistencies in their testimony. Oates was thrown in prison for a time, but three of the Queen's servants as well as Coleman were convicted.[17]

Coleman's was the first of the plot trials. Though he was convicted and subsequently executed on December 3rd, his trial began the effectual discrediting of Oates. Under cross-examination Oates' technical reliability began to waver. Soon his testimony alone was not sufficient to convict the Jesuits he accused and other informers had to be produced. A string of convictions and executions ensued. Charles was forced to sign the executions of men he knew to be innocent. First came the executions of the Jesuits Ireland, Pickering and Grove, accused of conspiracy to murder the King. Next came the executions of Green, Berry, and Hill, supposed murderers of Godfrey. In June 1679, those executed were Whitbread, Provincial of the English Jesuits, and Fenwick, Harcourt, Gavan, and Turner (other priests) also accused of conspiring to murder the King. In addition, Richard Langhorn, a Catholic lawyer, fell victim. Langhorn was accused of raising a Papist army to invade England. Thirty-seven deaths have been attributed to the perjured testimony of Oates and his fellow informers.[18]

The first major reverse occurred for Oates and his gang when they attempted to incriminate Samuel Pepys as a means of attacking James, Duke of York. Pepys had been chief advisor to James when he had been Lord High Admiral. The group attempted to get to Pepys through his clerk, Samuel Atkins. The plan was to accuse Atkins of complicity in Godfrey's murder in hopes that Atkins would testify against Pepys in his fear of being arrested. However, the plan backfired when Atkins not only refused to lie, but also produced a reliable alibi to prove his own innocence. Mr. Pepys, charged with being a Roman Catholic, was committed to the tower on May 22, 1679. Because the planned evidence was not forthcoming, he was released on June 2nd on bail of thirty-thousand pounds. On June 30, 1680, he was finally discharged without a trial.[19]

A second major set-back for Oates was the acquittal of Sir George Wakeman, the Queen's physician, and three Benedict brothers on July 18, 1679. The four were accused of conspiracy to poison the King and subvert the Protestant religion. The reason is not clearly identified why the Chief Justice did not support the informers but instead proved their testimony to be criminally perjured. The effect of this acquittal was the division of the nation into two halves--those who saw that they had been deceived and those who remained faithful to Oates. The latter were fast declining in number. Though restored somewhat by the sham "Meal Tub Plot" in October 1679, Oates' prestige suffered even more damage in June of 1680 when the Earl of Castlemain was acquitted in spite of Oates' testimony to the effect that Castlemain "had been in correspondence with the Spanish Jesuits as well as St. Omers about the 'design.'"[20]

The continued decline of Oates' followers is evidenced by the reaction to the trial and conviction of Viscount Stafford in November-December 1680 for treason:

> The people knew him to be blameless, except for his religion, and that the evidence given at his trial was one long tissue of lies by Shaftsbury's paid informers. Slowly their sanity was returning.[21]

By the time the last victim, Oliver Plunket, was executed, Oates' popularity had diminished greatly. Plunket, an Irish Archbishop, was hanged, drawn, and quartered on July 1, 1681. Again, Charles was aware that this victim was innocent, but he did nothing to save Plunket because "his [Charles] enemies were still waiting for him to make a false step."[22] However, in September 1681, Charles at last began to turn on the informers. Stephen College, a Whig intimate of many of the Plot witnesses was executed in August 1681 in spite of Oates' testimony in his defense. A week later his allowance from the King was entirely cut off and he was forbidden to appear at court. Oates' weekly allowance for maintenance had never been large in view of his residence at Whitehall Palace. Its reduction had begun in July 1680, and had always been temporary as he never received a funded pension for life from Charles. It is supposed that Shaftsbury paid some amount to Oates, but that is not certain. He did receive some money in lump sums as the author of his Narrative and other works: The Cabinet of the Jesuits' Secrets Opened, An Exact Discovery of the Mystery of Iniquity as it is now in Practice amongst the Jesuits, and The Pope's Warehouse, or, the Merchandise of the Whore of Rome, all published in 1679. During this time, a Tory journalist Sir Roger l'Estrange was periodically attacking the inconsistencies of Oates' original evidence. The nation gradually began to realize that Oates' plot was a fraud exploited by Shaftsbury for the purpose of excluding the "Papist" James II from succession. At age 30, Oates was again living on charity.[23]

In 1683, discovery of the "Rye House Plot," a conspiracy by Whig radicals to assassinate both the King and the Duke of York further destroyed Oates' most powerful supporters. However, he did not give up easily; in 1684 he petitioned the Bishop of London asking "how the government could in good conscience license denials of a Plot in which it had several times announced its belief."[24] This was to no avail as the Duke of York had been reinstated and loyalism was now the order of the day. On May 10th he was arrested for a treasonable remark made about the Duke of York in April 1680. Having no defense, he was charged one-hundred thousand pounds damages and thrown in debtors' prison. Further charges were brought against him for perjury and he was placed in chains. Two days after the death of Charles II his trial began. It focused on the perjured evidence he had given at the trial of Ireland, Grove, and Pickering on December 17, 1678. No lawyer would defend him and witnesses he called would not support his statements.[25]

In spite of Oates' adept defense in his own behalf, he was found guilty of perjury. The judges, noting that "sentence of death or mutilation was no longer legal," issued a sentence meant to serve the same end. In addition to a fine and being "unfrocked," he was sentenced to life imprisonment with annual appearances in the pillory. Before starting his imprisonment, he was to be whipped from Aldgate to Newgate; then after a day's rest from Newgate to Tyburn. The total distance was three and one-half miles. The fact that he survived to be imprisoned was remarkable. He remained in prison for the rest of James' reign with periodic appearances in the pillory as sentenced. When the "Glorious Revolution" came in 1688, he was freed. In 1689 he petitioned the House of Lords for a reversal of his sentence. Though he was granted a free pardon by William III, his conviction stood, and he was barred from appearing as a witness in any court of law. In addition, he was forbidden to practice his "priestly calling."[26]

Upon request by the Commons, he was granted a meager allowance of ten pounds per week from William III. This was later increased to a "lump sum of five-hundred pounds, and three-hundred pounds a year" in place of his allowance. Oates remained friendly with the "old Whig extremists," and publicized his feeling of martyrdom through his book A Display of Tyranny, which dealt with his treatment by James II. John Evelyn noted that William III did not approve of this book.[27]

The days of plotting and discovery of plots had come to an end. The fear of popery, as in the days of Charles II, had subsided; Oates could no longer find an audience for his tales of fiendish "designs" against the monarch or himself. In view of his circumstances, Oates was forced to undergo a personal transformation. In 1693 he abandoned his homosexuality and married a "wealthy city widow," probably to improve his financial status. In 1698 he effected a second change when he became a member of the Baptist clergy at Wapping. However, he continued to live up to his reputation as evidenced by his explusion in 1701, after several scandals. Titus Oates, a man whose perjured lies caused the execution or ruin of numerous innocent people in 1678-79, was a free man living on a funded pension on July 12, 1705, when he died at the age of 56--in the opinion of some, 56 years too late.[28]

NOTES

[1]John Leslie Miller, Popery and Politics in England, 1660-1688 (Cambridge, 1973), 152-53; David Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II (Oxford, 1934), 559-60.

[2]John Drinkwater, Mr. Charles: King of England (New York, 1926), 284-85.

[3]Christopher Falkus, Charles II, King of Great Britain, 1630-1685 (New York, 1972), 170; Ogg, England, 562.

[4]John Philipps Kenyon, The Popish Plot (New York, 1972), 46.

[5]Ibid., 47-50.

[6]Miller, Popery, 155-56.

[7]Jacob Abbott, History of King Charles The Second (New York, 1874), 275-77; Arthur Bryant, King Charles II (London, 1932), 270-71.

[8]Maurice Percy Ashley, Charles II: The Man and the Statesman (Washington, 1971), 224-30.

[9]Miller, Popery, 156.

[10]Ogg, England, 565-66.

[11]Bryant, King, 271; Drinkwater, Mr. Charles, 285.

[12]Thora G. Stone, England Under The Restoration (1660-1688) (London, 1923), 46.

[13]Ashley, Charles II, 231; John Harold Wilson, Nell Gwyn, Royal Mistress (New York, 1952), 219.

[14]William Bray, ed., Diary and Correspondence of John Evelyn F.R.S. to which is subjoined The Private Correspondence between King Charles I and Sir Edward Nicholas, and between Sir Edward Hyde, Afterwards Earl of Clarendon, and Sir Richard Browne (4 vols., London, 1884), II, 161.

[15]Abbott, History, 278-79; Ashley, Charles II, 234; Dennis Yates Wheatly, Old Rowley: A Private Life of Charles II (London, 1933), 145.

[16]William Cobbett, Parliamentary History of England, 1066-12 August 1803 (Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 36 vols., 1066-Jan. 23, 1777) I-XVIII Nov. 9, 1678, 1035-36.

[17]Abbott, History, 279-80; Kenyon, Plot, 110-15.

[18]Louise Fargo Brown, "Portrait of an Informer: A 17th Century Moral," Nation, 178 (April 1954), 274; Ogg, England, 590-91.

[19]Mynors Bright, ed., Diary and Correspondence of Samuel Pepys, Esq., F.R.S.: With a Life and Notes by Richard Lord Braybrooke (5 vols., New York, 1887), I, xxii; Maurice Petherick, Restoration Rogues (London, 1951), 81; John Harold Wilson, The Ordeal of Mr. Pepys' Clerk (Columbus, Ohio, 1972), 111-124.

[20]Bryant, King, 291, 295; Kenyon, Plot, 199.

[21]Wheatly, Old Rowley, 161.

[22]J.G. Muddiman, The King's Journalist: 1659-1689 Studies In the Reign of Charles II (New York, 1971), 210.

[23]Kenyon, Plot, 241-242.

[24]Ibid., 244.

[25]Ibid., 245-46.

[26]Brown, Informer, 274; Kenyon, Plot, 256-57.

[27]Bray, Evelyn, 354; Kenyon, Plot, 262-63.

[28]Drinkwater, Mr. Charles, 285.

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